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The article’s objective is to analyze the development and evolution of the Mexican pension 
reform not only as such but also of two main bodies: on the one hand, the regulator (the 
National Saving for Retirement) and the other, from the pension fund manager designed as 
a public-private partnership (PPP Manager Retirement Funds, Afore XXI). This article finds 
firstly, the existence of a horizontal degree of specialization and a potential lack of account-
ability and transparency in organizations responsible for regulating the pension system, and 
secondly that the presence of values  that may compete in public officials in developing their 
roles have affected the development of a new pension system in Mexico and the performance 
of the regulator.
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Transferencia de políticas y construcción de lecciones. El caso de la reforma al sistema 
de pensiones en México
RESUMEN
El objetivo del artículo consiste en estudiar la reforma en el sistema de pensiones en México, 
en particular, el desarrollo y evolución de la reforma de dos principales organismos, por un 
lado la agencia reguladora y por el otro de la administradora de fondos de pensiones diseñada 
como una asociación público-privada PPP. Los resultados son, la existencia de un grado de 
especialización horizontal y una potencial falta de rendición de cuentas y transparencia en 
las organizaciones encargadas de regular el sistema de pensiones, así como la presencia de 
valores de que pueden entrar en competencia en los funcionarios públicos en el desarrollo de 
sus funciones afectando el desarrollo de un nuevos sistema de pensiones y el desempeño del 
organismo regulador.
Palabras clave. Transferencia de políticas; sistema de pensiones; reforma administrativa; 
regulación
  
Transferência de políticas e construção de lições.  O caso da reforma do sistema de 
subsídios no México
RESUMO
O objetivo deste artigo consiste em estudar a reforma de um sistema de subsídios no México, 
em particular o desenvolvimento e evolução da reforma das principais organizações, por um 
lado a agência reguladora e, por outro lado, a administração de fundos de pensão criada como 
uma parceria público-privada (PPP). Os resultados são a existência de um grau de especializa-
ção horizontal e uma potencial falta de prestação de contas e transparências das organizações 
encarregadas de regular o sistema de pensões, assim como a presença de valores que podem 
entrar em concorrência nos funcionários públicos e no desempenho de suas funções, tendo 
impacto no desenvolvimento de novos sistemas de pensões e o desempenho de organização 
reguladora.
Palavras-chave. Transferência de políticas; sistema de pensões; reforma administrativa; re-
gulação
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Introduction
This article has two purposes, firstly to 
contribute to the understanding of the key 
features and potential paradoxes posed 
by the implementation of public-private 
partnerships (ppp), generally conceived as 
co-operation schemes between public and 
private complementary and interdependent, 
aimed at providing a public service or as 
a set of networks involving a variety of 
public and private actors (Koch and Buser, 
2006); secondly, to strengthen the research 
literature and development of and pension 
regulators from a transfer of public policies. 
In this sense, we are interested in the reforms 
of pension systems in Latin America and, in 
particular in some strategies, such as those 
followed in Chile and Mexico, and by which 
regulatory frameworks have been intro-
duced to monitor some elements of market.
During the 1990s, several Latin American 
countries were immersed in the fiscal crisis 
and in response to it, prompted a series of 
reforms that varied in scope and depth, many 
of them as part of commitments to interna-
tional agencies to change financial support. 
Others were inspired by some kind of fashion 
to make governments more efficient and re-
sponsive known as New Public Management 
and who have been transforming the social 
security systems in most of the world (Askim, 
Christensen, Fimreite, and Laegreid, 2010).
For some Latin  American countries, these 
ideas served to guide the reforms of their 
pension systems. In particular, this article 
focuses on the 1997 reform of the Mexican 
pension system, in particular on the analysis 
of the regulatory agency created (Comisión 
Nacional de Ahorro para el Retiro, consar) 
and a pension fund administrator designed as 
a public-private partnership (Administrador 
de Fondos para el Retiro, Afore xxi).
While administrative reforms have been 
designed primarily as rational strategies, we 
argue that reforms might be better when they 
are seen as a mixture of internal and exter-
nal institutional features, because they are 
embedded in a specific political and admin-
istrative context (Christensen, Laegreid, and 
Stigen, 2004). In general, this type of reform 
is oriented to the introduction of economic 
principles from the new institutionalism in 
economics in the public sector, as well as the 
implementation of managerial tools clos-
est to organizational new institutionalism. 
In other words, we refer to the study of the 
learning processes as a model that empha-
sizes how reforms are influenced by national 
administrative cultures, traditions, and the 
political context (Christensen and Lagreid, 
2007a, 2007b), but also to the study of new and 
useful perspectives for public management. 
In accordance with the new public man-
agement discourse, public organizations 
tend to develop a set of networks where 
a mixed collection of players in private, 
public and voluntary sectors, improve the 
governmental performance. Public-private 
partnerships have also become a form of 
structural devolution which involves a 
transfer of tasks from the central govern-
ment to the private sector (Christensen 
and Laegreid, 2007a). Thus, under the new 
public management context, public-private 
partnerships contain at least three elements: 
1) preference for private finance because of 
the problems related to technical capacity 
for the public officials; 2) complexity, which 
may reduce transparency, accountability 
and access to information; and 3) specific 
accountability and governance mechanisms, 
such as risk-sharing and flexible decision 
making processes (Hodge, 2007).
In this article, we focus on the exception, 
Afore xxi, which is the only publicly owned 
pension fund administrator. It is part of the 
Mexican Institute for Social Security (imss 
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for its initials in Spanish); the institution 
is responsible of providing social security 
services to workers in the formal sector. 
The staff and management of Afore XXI are 
both public but it competes with the private 
Afores in equal conditions. It provides ser-
vices as a private agency, and is subject to 
the regulation of the consar. 
The lesson-drawing or policy transfer 
perspective, explains reforms and their 
outcomes as a constructive learning process, 
which draws experience from other coun-
tries to improve national policies. It tries to 
respond under what circumstances and to 
what extent will a program that works there 
will work here (Rose, 2001) and entails dif-
ferent stages: diagnosing the problem and 
searching for a relevant program to imi-
tate;  abstracting a cause-and-effect model; 
designing and creating a lesson; and, han-
dling the problem of context and carrying 
out a prospective evaluation. Thus, lesson 
drawing/policy transfer implies a process 
of editing, filtering, interpreting and trans-
forming policies, and suggests that evalua-
tions should be carried out to measure the 
effectiveness of the public programs and the 
transferred model into the political system. 
This perspective also highlights the role 
international organizations have in promot-
ing and introducing administrative reforms. 
In this regard, the article emphasizes the 
manner in which the institutional context 
influenced the development and evolution 
of one part of the reform to the pension 
system in México as a part of a whole social 
welfare reform (Culebro, 2008).
Theoretically speaking the article draws 
from a combination of a lesson drawing 
model, policy transfer, and an institutional 
perspective it is intended to explore two ideas: 
 t The regulatory scenario. In line with new 
public management prescriptions and major 
structural reforms, an appropriate develop-
ment of public-private partnership would 
call for less regulation. However, in practice, 
regulation tends to increase and becomes 
more complex, because it combines rules 
from both the public and the private spheres;
 t The institutional design scenario. Regula-
tory agencies should be responsible for the 
regulation of public-private partnerships. 
However, it has been acknowledged that the 
institutional design of the regulatory agen-
cies has important effects on the functioning 
and outcomes of public-private partnerships, 
such as lack of accountability, transparency, 
and coordination within the public sector.
These scenarios are part of a collection of 
a new institutional arrangement that are the 
result of the introduction of a set of admin-
istrative and regulatory reforms in which, 
instead of integration of the participants in 
the financial system, we find fragmentation 
mainly due to horizontal specialization; the 
financial system has become more compli-
cated than before because of its existence. 
In addition, concerning the institutional 
design of the regulatory agencies as a sub-
stitute of obtaining technical and efficiency 
gains from the reform, lack of accountability 
and transparency are now significant is-
sues; as well as public servants are confused 
about their roles because competing values 
guide their activities (e.g., efficiency and 
legitimacy).
Methodological considerations
The text assumes that there are two major 
research strategies: quantitative and qualita-
tive methods and that, when it comes to ana-
lyze the process of administrative reform 
qualitative, methods provide data whose 
treatment requires a more interpretive and 
it is chosen when researchers are willing to 
study phenomena that evolve and change 
constantly. Sometimes the variables are not 
fully identified and theories can be developed 
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during the research process (Wieviorka, 
1992). In our case, we followed a strategy 
related to qualitative case studies in order to 
understand the meaning of the phenomena 
in holistic terms looking for plausible expla-
nations for events. From this perspective the 
cases are chosen for their conceptual richness 
(Yin, 1994) and seeks to advance the clarifi-
cation of concepts and empirical categories, 
defined primarily by the conceptual theoreti-
cal interest, and not by the methods used 
(Stake, 2007). The research is part of a much 
broader regulation and regulatory agencies 
funded by the National Council of Science 
and Technology in Mexico.
The order of the article is as follows: firstly, 
the main characteristics of the Mexican pen-
sion system are presented, then, the different 
stages of the policy transfer are showed and 
thirdly, we display the potential scenarios 
and final considerations.
1 The pension system in mexico: general 
considerations
Reforms to social security systems have 
become an important topic in recent years 
and generally share some common charac-
teristics, such as the creation of institutional 
arrangements that seek to reduce risks and 
vulnerability of society and the individual 
protecting her occupational retirement, 
health and unemployment, as well as other 
assistance such as maternity and accidents. 
In the case of México, the imss as the 
most important social welfare institution 
was created in 1943 to provide social security 
services, defined as the:
Right to health services, medical as-
sistance, protection of means to survive, 
and all the services required for (attain-
ing) individual and social wellbeing, as 
well as the provision of a pension (…) 
guaranteed by the state [Traduced by the 
authors]. (Ley del Seguro Social, dof 27-
05-2011, Congreso de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, Art.2, 2011)
Since its creation, the imss’ pension 
system has covered workers in the formal 
sector, and it has been financed through a 
three-party scheme. Employers contribute 
with about 70% of the social security con-
tributions to old age and severance,2 the 
employees’ share is 25%, and the remnant 
is contributed by the federal government.3 
For decades (until 1997), the imss pension 
system operated as a defined benefit regime 
also known as pay-as-you-go (paygo). This 
regime is characterized by a guaranteed pen-
sion which is not equivalent to the amount of 
equivalent contributions. 
On the other hand, in the 1960s, the In-
stitute for the Social Security of the Public 
Servants (Instituto de Seguridad Social al 
Servicio de los Trabajadores del Estado, 
issste) was created to provide services ex-
clusively to the public workers of the federal 
government. Since then, other organizations 
have been created to target specific popula-
tions, such as the workers of the national 
oil and energy companies (Mexican Oil 
—pemex— and the Federal Commission of 
Electricity —cfe; initials from their trans-
lation to Spanish). However, recently, the 
federal government has created the so-called 
Popular Insurance for those people that do 
not belong to the formal health institutions. 
As a result, the social security system in 
Mexico has become fragmented; the provi-
sion of services is vertical and focalized on 
specific segments of the population. 
2  Currently, 6,5% of the monthly wages goes to Afores’ 
individual accounts, 4,5% for old age and severance, and 
2% for the retirement sub-account.
3  Plus a social quota through a government contribution 
of 5,5% of one minimum wage per day, indexed to the 
consumer price index.
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2 First step. Diagnosis and search for a 
programm to imitate 
In 1995 the administration of President Er-
nesto Zedillo (1994–2000) started the reform 
of the social security system, and general ob-
jectives for this purpose were established in the 
National Plan for Development (Plan Nacional 
de Desarrollo —pnd— 1995–2000). The core of 
the reform was the intention of transforming 
the imss’ pension system, from paygo scheme 
to a system of individual accounts.
Defined-benefit (paygo) regimes are char-
acterized by the commitment of guaranteeing 
a pension that is defined by a formula, which 
may not be equivalent to the amount of in-
dividual contributions. The system is based 
on inter-generational solidarity, where the 
pensions of the retired are financed with the 
contributions of those still participating in 
the labor force. The model assumes that the 
proportion of contributions to the system 
will always be sufficient to pay the benefits 
at any time. The dynamics of population 
growth complicates this assumption, though. 
Increases in life expectancy rates, drops of 
births, and delays in joining the labor force 
can make this type of system financially 
unsustainable. For instance, demographic 
trends in Mexico and other Latin Ameri-
can countries indicate that the elderly will 
increase in number and importance in the 
years to come.
According to the Mexican National In-
stitute of Statistics and Geography (inegi 
for its initials in Spanish),4 8,2% of the total 
population of Mexico is sixty or more years 
old. Between 2005 and 2008, this group in-
creased from 7,9 to 8,8 million, and its average 
annual growth rate is about 3,5%, whereas 
the one of the total population is 0,88%. In 
terms of policy implications, the first problem 
is that aging processes increase the pressure 
4  The information presented above was consulted at: 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/ 
on paygo regimes, because the number of 
beneficiaries outnumber the amount of 
contributions available.
The second problem is that the pensions’ 
fund is administered by the government, 
which could be tempted to use these monies 
to face immediate financial problems. The 
third problem is that individual contribu-
tions were relatively high for international 
standards, which can be seen as disincentive 
to contribute. Summarizing, the reform of 
the imss pension system in the mid-1990s 
faced three main challenges: a growing 
asymmetry between benefits and contribu-
tions; the vulnerability of the system’s fund 
to be used for different purposes; and the 
existence of negative incentives to contrib-
ute to the system.
The main strategies recommended to 
resolve the problems of paygo regimes 
have been: Increasing the retirement age; 
increasing the amount of contributions; and 
protecting pension funds from discretion-
ary use (improving regulation). In order to 
improve the availability of contributions, 
some countries have passed laws increasing 
the age of retirement and/or the amount of 
contributions. In Latin America, Brazil is a 
good example of these measures. Canada, 
on the other hand, has developed a sophis-
ticated regulatory framework in order to 
make the pensions’ fund untouchable for 
purposes different from the payment of 
benefits (Abi-Ramia, 2008).5
In Mexico, these options were not viable 
at the time of the reform (mid-1990s). Firstly, 
because powerful unions opposed measures 
to increase either the retirement age or the 
amount of contributions; secondly, because 
issuing new regulation to protect the pen-
sions’ fund would bring the public’s atten-
5  See for example Abi-Ramia (2008) and “Agreement 
between the government of the united states of America 
and the government of Canada” (1981).
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tion to the fact that the government was 
misusing the pension monies. 
It is important to acknowledge the strong 
influence that strategies based on new public 
management prescriptions —in particular 
the introduction of market incentives for 
the performance of public organizations— 
had in Latin American countries during the 
1990s. In this manner, several reforms of the 
public sector in LatinAmerican countries in 
the 1990s introduced reforms of the pension 
systems, including new public management 
recommendations, such as the following: 
introduction of business-like management; 
client-oriented service provision; introduc-
tion of market competition; performance 
measurement and the development of perfor-
mance indicators and evaluations;  budgetary 
adjustments; privatization schemes; decen-
tralization; and intensive use of technologies 
of information and communication (tic).
As previously discussed, the Mexican Gov-
ernment had not many options for the pen-
sion system’s reform because of the existing 
political conditions: new veto power actors 
and pressures from traditional unions, and 
the influence from international agencies, ad-
vocators of new public management models. 
Moreover, it seems that new public manage-
ment measures were seen with sympathy by 
the top Mexican public officials, who were 
in charge of drawing the proposal. Many of 
them had obtained highly technical training 
in foreign universities, so it seems feasible 
that they were truly convinced about the 
benefits of the new public management pre-
scriptions. Moreover, some of these experts 
considered that a pension reform should 
also address the problem of low domestic 
savings. In this manner, the Mexican experts 
decided to replicate the Chilean pension 
reform (Brooks, 2011).
Without the opposition of the unions, 
and with the support of his party, that 
maintained a majority in the Congress, the 
president finally passed the social security 
reform. In 1997, the Mexican Congress passed 
the Law for the Retirement Savings (Ley de 
los Sistemas de Ahorro para el Retiro, dof 
21-01-2009, Congreso de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, 2009), which authorized the 
creation of Pension Funds Administrators 
(Administradoras de Fondos para el Retiro, 
Afores). The law also created a regulatory 
agency for the Afores, and the National Com-
mission of the Retirement Savings’ System 
(consar).
The reform allowed the participation of 
the private sector in some of the stages of 
the process of administration of the pension 
benefits. These stages are: 1) definition of the 
pension benefits; 2) collection of contribu-
tions (financing); 3) administration of the 
pension funds (investment); 4) delivery of the 
benefits (payment); and 5) information to the 
beneficiaries (Conferencia Interamericana 
de Seguridad Social — ciss, 2008). Under 
the new arrangement, Afores are entitled to 
decide the investment of the pensions’ funds, 
as long as they guarantee the pension benefits 
established by law; Afores are also responsible 
for paying the pension’ benefits to the people 
retired. All the pensions of individuals retired 
under the former scheme (paygo) will be 
financed with public funds.
The key transformation of this reform 
was the transit from a paygo system to an 
individual accounts scheme. As a conse-
quence of the reform, the crucial element 
of intergeneration solidarity disappeared, 
from then (1997) on, young working indi-
viduals would not contribute to finance the 
pension of the retired. 
In spite of the magnitude of the reform, 
it is worth noting that it could be modified 
—unless some institutional controls are put 
in force— because of its vulnerability to po-
litical swings. Consider for instance, recent 
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events in Argentina, where the government 
took back on the control of the formerly 
privately-managed pension system. The 
argument of the Argentinean authorities 
was that the private administrators were 
increasingly demanding the government’s 
support to help them face financial diffi-
culties. From the government’s perspective, 
bailing-out the private administrators would 
be more expensive than making a public 
agency responsible for the administration 
of pension funds. Critics of the Argentinean 
Government argued that the reform was 
intended to take over the management of 
the pension fund and its resources.
3 Development of a new organization. 
The creation of national commission of 
the retirement saving´s system (consar)
Mexico’s reform of the pension system may 
be seen as aligned to international trends. 
For instance, a main assumption behind the 
Mexican reform was that it would contrib-
ute to adapt the economy to the structural 
changes initiated in the early 1990s. It is 
worth noting that the reform has not fol-
lowed a homogeneous pattern mainly as 
a consequence of the particularities of the 
Mexican public sector and the legal system. 
By contrast, reforms of the financial system 
show a more common pattern. This is an 
important point considering that in the pen-
sion system participate many institutions 
related to the financial sector. Thus, in addi-
tion to the consar, the system is integrated 
by the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of 
Mexico, the National Banking Commission, 
the National Insurance Commission, and 
the National Commission for the Protection 
and Advise of Users of Financial Services. 
The creation and evolution of consar 
reveals the complexity and homogeneity of 
the financial system, but different from other 
regulatory bodies, the pension market is 
very new and it has a high social impact. The 
consar was created in July 1994 and modi-
fied in 1996; it is a regulatory agency mainly 
responsible of guaranteeing law enforce-
ment and compliance from agents (Afores) 
to the regulation of the pension system. In 
general, consar must assure the function-
ing of the system, paying attention to crucial 
issues such as the solvency and stability of 
the Afores, the regulation of risk manage-
ment and the promotion of self-regulation 
and self-supervision. consar is responsible 
of three main areas of the pension system: 
coordination, regulation, and surveillance. 
The Commission has been created as a 
de-concentrated public agency, endowed 
with technical autonomy, but it belongs 
to the administrative sector headed by the 
Ministry of Finance. From an instrumental/
structural perspective, and based on the 
premise that organizational adjustments 
might modify governmental behavior, the 
Commission’s organization has three main 
mechanisms of governance: presidency; 
board of directors; and a consulting and 
surveillance committee.
Due to the specific nature of the regulated 
sector, the Governing Board is composed of 
representatives of the social security system, 
employers, workers, and the federal govern-
ment. The Board is headed by the Secretary 
of the Treasury, and is composed of: consar 
President, two Vice Presidents, the Secre-
tary of Labor, Central Bank Governor, the 
directors of imss and issste, the National 
Housing Fund for Workers housing Fund, 
the President of the National Banking and 
President of the National Insurance and 
Bonding. The other members are appointed 
by the Secretary of the Treasury, including 
four representatives of the workers’ union 
and one employer (consar, 2006).
Similar to other regulatory bodies, the 
commission structure provides valuable 
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information about the organization of 
the mechanisms of government and its 
decision-making processes. Such as the ex-
istence of two mechanisms of control. One is 
the Ministry of Public Functions (sfp for its 
initials in Spanish) which is the Comptroller 
General of the overseer of public officials to 
prevent misuse of misconduct (corruption, 
abuse), and the other mechanism is the 
Monitoring and Control Committee com-
posed of six representatives of workers, six 
of employers, by the President of the Com-
mission, and six by the federal government. 
In practice, this committee works closely 
with the Governing Board as an advisory 
body. Importantly consar dependence with 
the Secretariat, as though there is no formal 
veto, the influence of the Secretariat for this 
present in the processes established for the 
approval of the Commission’s budget for 
the creation of aphorisms and the rules for 
international treaties.
The president of the Commission is 
appointed by the Ministry of Finance. 
The president is considered as the high-
est administrative authority and is able to 
delegate authority to other bodies of the 
Commission. The president holds the legal 
representation of the Commission and its 
administration, and proposes the appoint-
ment of removal of the vice-presidents and 
the secretary. In terms of responsibility 
and duties, the president is responsible for 
implementing the administrative guidelines 
established by the board or directors, and is 
also accountable to the Ministry of Finance. 
The president must inform these authori-
ties (the Board and the Ministry) about 
the Commission’s budgetary situation and 
other relevant issues. Finally, the president 
also receives recommendations from the 
Consulting and Surveillance Committee. 
In the consar’s case, the composition 
of the board of directors provides valuable 
information about the organization’s gover-
nance mechanism and its decision-making 
processes. Firstly, we can see that consar’s 
president is appointed by the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and a majority of the board members 
belong to the federal government, whereas 
only a minor proportion represents the 
workers and the employers. Secondly, there 
are two control mechanisms. One of them 
is a general comptroller from the Ministry 
of Public Function, which is responsible for 
the surveillance of public servants to prevent 
abuse bad behavior (corruption, abuses). 
The other mechanism is the Consulting and 
Surveillance Committee, which is composed 
by six representatives of the workers, six rep-
resentatives of the employers, the president 
of the Commission, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Ministry of Labour, a representative of 
the Central Bank and three representatives 
of the social security system. This Com-
mittee is informed about the licenses and 
revocations of Afores, and is in charge of 
approving independent (external) board 
members and compliance officers of the 
Afores. The Committee also provides advice 
about the investment regime, the structure 
of the commissions, and the strategies to 
avoid monopolistic practices. In the practice, 
the Committee operates closely to the board 
of directors as a consultant body.
As for the mechanisms of transparency 
and accountability, construction is required 
to submit a quarterly report to Congress on 
the status of the system of retirement sav-
ings, which include inter alia, the decisions 
taken by the Commission, and information 
for workers and the Afores. It is also obliged 
to give access to any information related 
to savings schemes to the general public 
either in statistics, publications or website. 
Besides this, the president must submit to 
the Board a semiannual and annual report 
on the performance of the Commission and 
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savings schemes, and finally, to present an 
annual report to the Ministry of Finance or 
to present specific reports when actions and 
concrete cases require so.
4 New forms of colaboration. The imss 
and the ppsafore xxi
The pension fund administrator Afore xxi 
(Siglo xxi) is a single-purpose organization, 
created as a result of horizontal specialization 
in financial matters. Siglo xxi is part of the 
system regulated by consar; but, different 
from other Afores, it can be seen as a public-
private partnership. Siglo xxi is owned by 
two entities, the imss and Prudential Finan-
cial Inc., which is a United States’ private 
insurance company that offers life insurance 
mutual funds, annuities, and pension and 
retirement-related services.
Because of the nature of Siglo xxi, its 
regulation has become a hybrid which 
combines rules from both public and private 
legislation. For instance, in accordance with 
the Law for the Retirement Savings, Afores 
can be constituted as private corporations 
with variable capital, and they shall not 
use any designation in foreign language or 
related with any religious connotation. Their 
corporate governance is also limited by the 
law, because Afores must have at least five 
members in their respective boards of direc-
tors, and consar must be informed about 
any change in their composition. 
Likewise, Afores require the approval 
of the consar’s Control and Surveillance 
Committee to appoint their comptrollers 
and independent members of the board. 
It is established by the law that the Afores’ 
boards may incorporate independent coun-
cilors specialized in financing, economics, 
law or social security, without any kind of 
patrimonial link or labor relation with other 
fund pension. In this manner, some of the 
most important decisions of Siglo xxi, such 
as its self-regulation program and manage-
ment contracts signed with other companies, 
require the approval of these external coun-
cilors. According to the same law, Afores’ 
capital is divided in two parts: one part—up 
to 51% of the company’s total capital—that 
can only be acquired by Mexicans or Mexi-
can companies, controlled by Mexicans; 
and the second part—up to 49%—which is 
considered as available for free subscription, 
which implies that foreigners and foreign 
firms may purchase it.
5 Reform to the pension system. Two 
potential scenarios
Previous sections revised the case of the 
Mexican pension system, in particular the 
situation of one administration fund (Afore 
xxi) and the role of the main regulatory 
agency (consar), in order to reveal some 
of the problems with public-private partner-
ship’s implementation. The analysis focused 
on the divergences between the reformers’ 
discourse about the advantages of new public 
management prescriptions and the public-
private partnerships schemes, and the man-
ner in which they tend to operate in reality 
and in particular contexts. The reform of 
the pension system was based on the idea of 
gaining efficiency and effectiveness through 
the introduction of a market-reassembling 
mechanism (Afores, public-private part-
nership). Nevertheless, the analysis of the 
governance bodies and the combination of 
public and private areas suggests that these 
may become sources of tension and conflict, 
and developing some kind of new forms of 
organizational hybrids with a high level of 
complexity (Christensen, Knuth, Laegreid, 
and Wiggan, 2009). 
5.1 First scenario: the regulatory State
The pension system in Mexico is part of the 
broader reform to the social security struc-
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ture (imss, Afore, consar, issste,6etc.), 
often related to the so-called regulatory 
state. As we saw, far from achieving an in-
tegration of the participants in the financial 
system, the reform has led to fragmentation 
associated to the participants’ increased 
horizontal specialization. This can be seen 
in the functioning of the several commis-
sions created to address specific problems. 
One interesting outcome is that some func-
tions of the commissions tend to overlap; 
for instance, whereas one regulatory agency 
is dedicated to insurance matters only, an-
other also resolves complaints against in-
surance companies. The case of the consar 
is an illustration of how the situation under 
the new system may become more complex. 
On one hand, Afores are regulated by the 
consar; on the other hand, simultaneously, 
they must abide to the rules established by 
other agencies such as the National Bank-
ing Commission and the National Com-
mission of Insurance, as well as to compete 
with globalised market characterized by its 
dynamism and continuous transformation.
In contrast to that, the reform of the 
pension system is also part of a broader 
process of administrative modernization 
and institutional changes, such as the regu-
latory reform and the processes of political 
and economic openness. The reform intro-
duced a private-market mechanism eco-
nomic competence for the administration 
of pension funds. In consequence, a regu-
latory agency, with sufficient autonomy to 
carry out its functions, was required. In this 
sense, an important outcome of the reform 
has been a system which involves diverse 
actors with competing interests, agencies 
with different organizational designs and 
goals and complex co-ordination mecha-
6  Instituto de Seguridad Social de los Trabajadores 
del Estado, translated as Social Security Institute for 
public workers. 
nisms. The analysis of Afore XXI sheds light 
on the way public-private partnerships 
tend to operate in particular contexts, and 
about potential sources of tension and con-
flict. One of the most important sources of 
tension identified in the analysis is the exis-
tence of two sets of regulation, one private 
and one public, operating simultaneously 
to regulate market of Afores.
5.2 The institutional design scenario. New 
organizational hybrids
One of the fundamental premises on which 
regulatory reform and the creation of regu-
latory agencies are based, is the belief that 
these measures are politically neutral and 
isolated from ideological and political influ-
ence. In the Mexican case it was assumed 
that the introduction of market mechanism 
and the creation of the regulatory agency 
would yield technical effects only. Neverthe-
less, there have been some unexpected and 
undesirable outcomes related to account-
ability and transparency issues. For instance, 
the procedure established to submit and 
exercise the consar’s budget does not 
provide rules of accountability and for good 
corporate governance practices.
In addition, regulatory reforms ac-
knowledge the importance of removing 
politicians from regulation to guarantee 
that decisions are made on the basis of 
professional competence and specialized 
knowledge; they also seek to maintain 
the stability of the public administration 
structure. The pension reform and the 
introduction of public-private partnership 
seemed to follow these assumptions; how-
ever, it must be noted that public servants 
are immersed within a complex framework 
where they operate in the face of competing 
values, such as efficiency and legitimacy. 
In this sense, there is always the pres-
sure for a public official to provide more 
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importance to one set of principles (techni-
cal efficiency for example) in detriment of 
the other (e.g., representation of the public 
interest). Besides that, reforms are shaped 
by and reflect historical legacies and par-
ticular political views; in consequence, it is 
always difficult to find an appropriate bal-
ance between autonomy, control, technical 
feasibility, and the protection of democratic 
values (Lopez-Ayllon y Ruiz, 2007).
 
6 Final considerations
The article focuses on the institutional trans-
formations of the pension system in Mexico, 
the origins of the reform and how it was 
conceived as a feasible solution to the former 
system’s financial weakness and promotes 
internal saving; it also addresses the main 
features of the reform, emphasizing deci-
sions on institutional design, the introduc-
tion of market competition (Afores) and the 
creation of a regulatory agency (consar). 
Finally, it points out some contradictory 
outcomes of the implementation of public-
private partnership schemes (siglo xxi). In 
this sense, the study contributes to fill a gap 
in the study of public-private partnerships, 
since several studies are concerned with 
the economical or financial effects rather 
than questioning about the paradoxes of 
implementation, and its interaction with 
particularities of the context. The results of 
the analysis of the case are in line with the 
argument that regulatory reforms may blur 
the public-private boundaries, and lead to 
institutional designs characterized by a high 
degree of complexity and potential problems 
associated with transparency and account-
ability issues.
The article also illustrates some of the 
problems that may arise from the naive 
and almost automatic adoption of foreign 
models, even though it may be seen to the 
construction as a result of a process of diffu-
sion and institutional isomorphism in Latin 
America (Levi-Faur, 2005). For example, the 
study describes the process of diagnosing 
the problem, finding an appropriate pro-
gram to imitate, and decisions to replicate 
the experience of other countries that occurs 
within an institutional home and where they 
have to coexist with the traditional forms 
pubic management with the new principles 
and values  brought from the ngp. 
Finally, it is expected that these lines may 
contribute to the debate on the reforms as 
multidimensional and complex process, 
and in particular on products regulatory 
mechanisms of the processes of administra-
tive modernization.
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